SFB 504 discussion paper 05-08

Alexander Zimper
Sonderforschungsbereich 504
L 13, 15, D-68131 Mannheim
zimper@bigfoot.com

Equivalence between best responses and undominated


Abstract:
For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce's (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.
Keywords:
JEL-Classification:
Project:
C8 Eichberger
Creation date:
2005-02-21
Publication Status
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 7 pp. 1-6
Downloadable version
http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp05-08.pdf
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