SFB 504 discussion paper 97-40

Siegfried K. Berninghaus
Universität Karlsruhe
RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe

Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Universitaet Karlsruhe
RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe

Claudia Keser
Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie
Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe

The invisible hand: Experiments on strategy selection in population games

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state.
C4 Berninghaus
Creation date:
Publication Status
Experimental Economics 2, 41-57, 1999.
Downloadable version
Download titlepage for internal use only

Direct questions and comments to our webmaster.