SFB 504 discussion paper
L 13, 17, D-68131 Mannheim
Dep.of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
132, Balmes, E-08008 Barcelona
Local and Group Interaction in Prisoners` Dilemmas
- We experimentally study the effects of locality in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. We compare players located on a circle with those in neighbourless groups. On circles players interact only with neighbours, but not with distant players. In groups all players interact with each other in the same way. We observe less cooperation on circles than in (neighbourless) groups. This is explained through different learning behaviour and a different way to use cooperation as a signal.
- Local interaction, Experiments, Prisoners` Dilemma
- C72; C92; D74; D83; H41; R12
- Z2 Oechssler
- Creation date:
- Publication Status
- Under revision at the Economic Journal
- Downloadable version
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