SFB 504 discussion paper 00-11

Oliver Kirchkamp
Sonderforschungsbereich 504
L 13, 17, D-68131 Mannheim
oliver@kirchkamp.de

Rosemarie Nagel
Dep.of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
132, Balmes, E-08008 Barcelona
rosemarie.nagel@econ.upf.es

Local and Group Interaction in Prisoners` Dilemmas


Abstract:
We experimentally study the effects of locality in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. We compare players located on a circle with those in neighbourless groups. On circles players interact only with neighbours, but not with distant players. In groups all players interact with each other in the same way. We observe less cooperation on circles than in (neighbourless) groups. This is explained through different learning behaviour and a different way to use cooperation as a signal.
Keywords:
Local interaction, Experiments, Prisoners` Dilemma
JEL-Classification:
C72; C92; D74; D83; H41; R12
Project:
Z2 Oechssler
Creation date:
2000-01-13
Publication Status
Under revision at the Economic Journal
Downloadable version
http://www.kirchkamp.de/research/expLoc.html
Download titlepage for internal use only
pdf-file


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