SFB 504 discussion paper 99-20

Claudia Keser
Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie
Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe
keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de

Jean-Louis Rullière
GATE - CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2
93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130 Ecully
rulliere@gate.cnrs.fr

Marie-Claire Villeval
GATE - CNRS
93, Chemin des Mouilles


Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence


Abstract:
When collective agreements apply to all employees, whether unionized or not, what is the rationale behind joining a union? The paper presents an experiment on a two-stage game. In the first stage, the decision to join a union is modeled as a voluntary contribution to a public good. In the second stage, the unionized employees bargain with the employer over wages. The experimental evidence reveals that: i) the union density is higher than predicted by theory but declining over time, ii) the size of the union increases the employees' bargaining power but not as much as predicted.
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Project:
C4 Berninghaus
Creation date:
1999-03-17
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