Base-rate fallacy
In making probabilistic inferences perceivers ought to take account of general, broadly based
information about population characteristics, and more specifically the prior probability of an
event occuring. The tendency to under use, sometimes even ignore, such information is called
the base rate fallacy.
Some authors
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973)
explain this phenomenon with respect to the representativeness heuristic.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)
argue that the base-rate fallacy is due to the presentation of
the information in probability format and that natural sampling reduces the base-rate fallacy.
See also:
Bayes theorem,
natural sampling,
representativeness heuristic
Literature:
Kahneman & Tversky (1973),
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995),
Manstead & Hewstone (1995), p. 85
